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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
After a jury trial, Kirk Allen Huff was convicted of one count of attempted burglary. 
He received a unified sentence of three years, with one year fixed. On appeal, Mr. Huff 
contends that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury that they must be 
unanimous in their determination of which of the alleged acts Mr. Huff engaged in 
constituted attempted burglary. Mr. Huff further contends that there was insufficient 
evidence to convict him of attempted burglary, and further contends that his aggregate 
sentence represents an abuse of the district court's discretion, as it is excessive given 
any view of the facts. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On January 25, 2012, Mr. Huff was observed standing in the alley near the back 
of his neighbor's house. (Tr., p.82, Ls.8-10.) While in the alley, he picked up a piece of 
wood approximately two feet long by four by four inches wide. (Tr., p.106, Ls.17-23, 
p.112, Ls.17-19; State's Ex. 2.) It had several nails sticking out of it. (Tr., p.97, Ls.4-5.) 
He then allegedly struck the board against the door of a utility trailer owned by Ward 4 
of the Latter Day Saints church that was used for Boy Scout camp-outs. (Tr., p.100, 
Ls.3-14.) The trailer was being stored by Mr. Huff's neighbor a few doors down, Chad 
Nelson. (Tr., p.87, Ls.3-6, p.100, Ls.10-12.) Mr. Nelson observed what appeared to be 
Mr. Huff hitting the trailer, confronted him, and then he watched Mr. Huff walk, then run, 
away. (Tr., p.96, Ls.6-25, p.98, L.25 - p.99, L.15.) Mr. Huff was later found hiding in 
some bushes in the alleyway. (Tr., p.101, Ls.2-12.) Mr. Huff appeared to be intoxicated 
during the incident. (Tr., p.137, Ls.7-14.) 
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Mr. Huff was charged by information with attempted burglary. (R., pp.32-33.) 
At trial, the owner/caretaker of the trailer, Mr. Nelson, testified that around 8:00 
p.m., one of his children came into his house and told him that there were two men 
trying to break into his utility trailer parked at the back of his property. (Tr., p.82, L.8 -
p.83, L.1.) Mr. Nelson and his wife went outside to see if they could see the two men, 
but there was nobody there. (Tr., p.83, Ls.1-4, p.88, Ls.1-8.) Mr. Nelson observed a 
great amount of damage to the trailer-the two top corners of the door were destroyed, 
as was the bottom left-hand corner and the left-hand locking mechanism was also 
destroyed. (Tr., p.83, Ls.10-13, p.86, Ls.19-23.) The two men who purportedly 
damaged the locking mechanism were not identified; however, during both his opening 
and closing remarks the prosecutor referred to this incident. 
During his opening argument, the prosecutor stated that he would be showing 
the jury that Mr. Huff attempted to commit burglary using: the video and the damage to 
the trailer, particularly to the padlock, the statements of Mr. Huff and the fact that he hid 
in the bushes: 
And so, again, the things we're going to show you in our argument that he 
attempted to commit burglary are the video, the damage to the trailer, 
particularly to the padlock. On that video you'll hear loud sounds. You'll 
see a picture of the four-by-four, which is just two two-by-fours. The 
statements that Mr. Huff makes and also the fact that he's hiding in the 
bushes after the police get called. 
(Trial Tr., p.74, Ls.3-10.) 
In his closing argument, the prosecutor implied that it was Mr. Huff who initially 
caused the damage to the locking mechanism: 
So what the Defense is trying to suggest, that coincidentally some 
unknown people caused the majority of this damage and then Mr. Huff 
showed up soon thereafter and, unbeknownst to him, these other two 
people had tried to break in and that he just thought, "I'm going to commit 
some vandalism right now and commit this vandalism, and then I was 
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caught." What a coincidence. We have these two unknown burglars in the 
area at the same time Mr. Huff was trying to just vandalize the lock of the 
trailer. That is not reasonable to believe that. So rely on your common 
sense in making this decision. That's what it means to - that's what 
reasonable doubt's all about is that common sense. 
(Tr., p.175, Ls.3-16.) 
The jury was instructed on the elements of attempted burglary: 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Attempted Burglary, the state 
must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about July 25, 2012 
2. in the state of Idaho 
3. the defendant Kirk Huff did some act which was a step 
towards committing the crime of burglary, and 
4. at the time of said act, the defendant had the specific intent 
to commit the crime of theft. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant guilty. 
(Jury Instruction No. 21, attached to the Motion to Augment filed on August 14, 2013.) 
The jury found Mr. Huff guilty of attempted burglary. (R., p.71) The district court 
imposed a unified sentence of three years, with one year determinate and retained 
jurisdiction over Mr. Huff. (Tr., p.186, Ls.19-25; R., pp.76-78.) Mr. Huff appeals from 
the judgment of conviction. 1 (R., pp.80-83.) 
1 Mr. Huff also filed a Rule 35 motion, seeking leniency, which was denied by the district 
court. (Motion to Reduce Sentence, attached to the Motion to Augment filed on 
August 14, 2013; Minute Entry denying Rule 35 motion, attached to the Motion to 
Augment filed on August 14, 2013.) In light of the relevant standards of review, Mr. Huff 
does not raise the issue of the district court's denial of his Rule 35 motion in this appeal. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err by failing to instruct the jury on unanimity? 
2. Was there substantial competent evidence to support Mr. Huff's conviction for 
attempted burglary? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of 
three years, with one year fixed, upon Mr. Huff following his conviction for 
attempted burglary? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Denied Mr. Huff His Constitutional And Statutory Rights To A 
Unanimous Jury Verdict When It Failed To Give The Jury A Unanimity Instruction 
A. Introduction 
Some members of the jury could have found that the act of hitting the locking 
mechanism was committed by Mr. Huff and constituted the attempt, while other 
members of the jury may have felt that Mr. Huff's act of picking up the piece of wood 
was an attempt. Ultimately, Mr. Huff could have been convicted of attempted burglary 
either by the actions of the two unknown individuals in the alley who damaged the 
latching mechanisms on the trailer, or by the act of picking up the board and/or by 
hitting the trailer with the board or perhaps even by hiding in the bushes that night. 
Jurors in Idaho must unanimously agree on a guilty verdict. Under the facts and 
circumstances of this case, the district court was required to instruct the jurors that they 
must unanimously agree on which act or acts constituted the attempted burglary. In 
failing to give the obligatory unanimity instruction, the district court denied Mr. Huff's 
constitutional and statutory rights to a unanimous verdict, thereby committing both 
reversible and fundamental error. 
The jury was instructed on the elements of attempted burglary - the jury was 
instructed that the State must prove, inter alia, that "the defendant Kirk Huff did some 
act which was a step towards committing the crime of burglary, and at the time of said 
act, the defendant had the specific intent to commit the crime of theft."2 (Jury Instruction 
2 Jury Instruction No. 21 provided: 
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No. 21, attached to the Motion to Augment the Record, filed on August 14, 2013 
(emphasis added).) Because the jury was informed that it need only find that Mr. Huff 
committed "some act" and that at the time of "said act, the defendant has the specific 
intent to commit the crime of theft", the district court failed to protect jury unanimity 
because where the jury was never instructed as to which act alleged by the State 
constituted the attempted burglary, the district court was therefore required to instruct 
the jurors that they must unanimously agree on which of the alleged acts constituted the 
alleged attempted burglary. This Court should vacate Mr. Huff's conviction. 
8. Because Separate And Distinct Incidents Of Criminal Conduct Could Provide A 
Basis For The Jurors' Finding Of Guilt On The Attempted Burglary Charge, The 
Trial Court Erred When It Failed To Instruct The Jury That It Must Unanimously 
Agree On The Specific Incident Constituting The Offense 
Jurors must be instructed on all of the matters of law necessary for their 
consideration, including "instructions on rules of law that are 'material to the 
determination of a defendant's guilt or innocence."' State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 
710 (2009) (citing I.C. § 19-2132 and quoting State v. Mack, 132 Idaho 480, 483 
(Ct. App. 1999)). Idaho law requires a trial court to instruct the jury that they must 
unanimously agree on the defendant's guilt in order for the defendant to be convicted. 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Attempted Burglary, the state 
must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about July 25, 2012 
2. in the state of Idaho 
3. the defendant Kirk Huff did some act which was a step 
towards committing the crime of burglary, and 
4. at the time of said act, the defendant had the specific intent 
to commit the crime of theft. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you 
must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty. 
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Id. at 711 (citing Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261, 267-268 (Ct. App. 2000).) In order to 
preserve the right to a unanimous jury verdict, a unanimity instruction must be given 
"when it appears that there is a genuine possibility of jury confusion or that a conviction 
may occur as the result of different jurors concluding that the defendant committed 
different acts." State v. Gain, 140 Idaho 170, 172 (Ct. App. 2004). 
Where the evidence indicates that separate and distinct incidents of 
criminal conduct could provide a basis for a juror's finding of guilt on the 
criminal charge in any count, the trial court must instruct the jury that it 
must unanimously agree on the specific incident constituting the offense in 
each count. ... 
Id. at 172-73. "A unanimity instruction is used to tell the jury that they must find a 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on a single agreed upon incident, 
thus ensuring the defendant has a unanimous jury verdict." State v. Montoya, 140 
Idaho 160, 167 (Ct. App. 2004). 
However, "[a]n instruction that the jury must unanimously agree on the facts 
giving rise to the offense ... is generally not required." Id. There is an important 
exception to this general principle "when a defendant commits several acts, each of 
which would independently support a conviction for the crime charged." Id. 
The Idaho Supreme Court distinguished the facts in State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 
970, 977 (2008), from the line of cases in which the Idaho Court of Appeals held that 
when "several distinct criminal acts support one count, jury unanimity must be protected 
by the state's election of the act upon which it will rely for conviction or by a clarifying 
instruction requiring the jurors to unanimously agree that the same underlying criminal 
act has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Johnson, 145 Idaho at 977 (quoting 
Gain, 140 Idaho at 173 (emphasis in original).) The Johnson Court distinguished the 
facts in Johnson from those in cases such as Gain, 140 Idaho 170, Montoya, 140 Idaho 
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at 167-168; Miller, 135 Idaho at 267-268, finding that in Johnson, there was no evidence 
of more criminal acts that had not been charged. Id. In Johnson, only one criminal act 
was charged-first-degree murder-and no evidence was presented of additional 
criminal acts. Id. 
Similarly, in Severson, the defendant was alleged to have murdered his wife by 
alternative means - either by suffocating her or by poisoning her. Severson, at 701. 
The defendant argued that the district court was required to instruct the jury that they 
must be unanimous in determining the means by which he allegedly committed the 
murder. Id. at 710. In rejecting Severson's argument, the Idaho Supreme Court found 
"the trial court in this case was not required to instruct the jury that it must unanimously 
agree on the means by which Severson killed his wife" because he "was charged with 
the single act of murdering his wife." Id. at 712. Furthermore, the Court reasoned, 
Although the evidence showed that Severson could have murdered his 
wife by either overdosing her or suffocating her, it did not indicate that 
separate incidents involving distinct unions of mens rea and actus reus 
occurred. The very nature of the crime of murder eliminates this 
possibility. Absent evidence of more than one instance in which Severson 
engaged in the charged conduct, the jury was not required to unanimously 
agree on the facts giving rise to the offense. 
Id. The Court recognized that the defendant could not be convicted of the single charge 
of murdering his wife on more than one occasion; thus, the district court did not err by 
failing to give a unanimity instruction. Id. 
However, Idaho Courts have long recognized that a unanimity instruction is 
necessary where separate crimes, requiring proof of distinct unions of mens rea and 
actus reus, are alleged, even where the separate crimes are alleged in one count. The 
ultimate question is whether each alleged incident was part of a single course of 
conduct. State v. Major, 111 Idaho 410, 414 (1986). As the Major Court noted, the 
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distinction between whether a course of conduct constitutes one or multiple offense is 
important as, 
to charge a defendant with two offenses when only one was committed 
violates the defendant's right against double jeopardy, U.S. Const. amend. 
V, Idaho Const. art. 1, § 13; conversely, to charge a defendant with one 
offense when more than one was committed can prejudice the defendant 
"in the shaping of evidentiary rulings, in producing a conviction on less 
than a unanimous verdict as to each separate offense, in sentencing, in 
limiting review on appeal, and in exposing the defendant to double 
jeopardy." Criminal Procedure, § 19.2(e), p. 457. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
In Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261 (Ct. App. 2000), the Idaho Court of appeals held 
that the "act or acts" language contained in Idaho Code § 18-1508 ("Lewd conduct with 
a minor child under sixteen"), does not "allow for a continuing course of conduct 
element. Rather, the legislature's use of the plural is a recognition that a series of 
sexual contacts by different means which occur as a part of a single incident, i.e., a 
continuous transaction without significant breaks, are to be charged as a single count of 
lewd conduct." Id. at 266. Based upon the evidence presented at trial, the Miller Court 
found that the defendant was alleged to have committed six separate acts of manual to 
genital contact and that trial counsel was deficient in failing to request a unanimity 
instruction (although the court found there was no prejudice). Id. at 267-269. 
Furthermore, in State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 33-34 (1997), the Idaho Supreme 
Court rejected the defendant's argument that his double jeopardy rights were violated 
based upon his being charged with and convicted of both lewd conduct and infamous 
crime against nature, as each act of fellatio performed on the victim were separate and 
distinct. The Court found, 
The first sexual assault took place on J.S.'s bed. The second assault took 
place on J.S.'s couch. The amended information clearly required proof of 
these different facts. Further, other events occurred in between these acts 
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of sexual assault. After the first assault, J.S. was pulled off the bed and 
thrown onto the couch where Bush told J.S. he wanted J.S. to engage in 
fellatio. J.S. refused and was pushed to his knees and Bush tied a t-shirt 
around J.S.'s face. Bush again placed J.S. on the couch and tied his arms 
behind his back with a cord. It was after these events that the second act 
of sexual assault occurred. Bush then again placed J.S.'s penis in his 
mouth for five to ten minutes. These facts appear to demonstrate that 
there were two separate and distinct sexual assaults committed on J.S. 
Id. at 34. Similarly, in State v. Grinolds, 121 Idaho 673 (1992), the Court found no 
double jeopardy violation where the defendant was convicted of two counts of rape, as 
the evidence showed that despite the fact that each act occurred in the same bedroom, 
the defendant left the bedroom between each act and jury was properly instructed they 
had to consider each alleged act separately. Id. at 675. 
Thus, while Idaho law does not generally require jury unanimity of the underlying 
facts supporting an element of the crime, where a crime is alleged to have been 
committed by alternative means and where the defendant is alleged to have committed 
separate and distinct criminal acts, Idaho law requires unanimity even if the acts are 
alleged in a single count. 
Here, Mr. Huff was charged with one count of attempted burglary. (R., pp.60-61.) 
The jury instruction which set forth the elements of an attempt told the jury that it need 
only find that Mr. Huff did "some act;" however, the jury was never instructed what that 
actwas. (Jury Instruction No. 21, attached to the Motion to Augment the Record, filed 
on August 14, 2013.) Thus, faced with this ambiguity, the jury was essentially free to 
find that any act of Mr. Huff's constituted an attempt, and further there was no 
requirement that they had to agree what that act was. 
Even the opening and closing statements by the State did not clarify what act the 
State was trying to prove constituted an attempt. During his opening argument, the 
prosecutor stated that he would be showing the jury that Mr. Huff attempted to commit 
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burglary using: the video and the damage to the trailer, particularly to the padlock, the 
statements of Mr. Huff and the fact that he hid in the bushes: 
And so, again, the things we're going to show you in our argument that he 
attempted to commit burglary are the video, the damage to the trailer, 
particularly to the padlock. On that video you'll hear loud sounds. You'll 
see a picture of the four-by-four, which is just two two-by-fours. The 
statements that Mr. Huff makes and also the fact that he's hiding in the 
bushes after the police get called. 
(Trial Tr., p.74, Ls.3-10.) Thus the State listed several acts which could possibly have 
constituted an attempt. The jurors could possibly have found any one of these acts 
constituted an attempt. The district court failed to identify which act it was asking the 
jury to find was or was not an attempt. 
Further, there was also testimony and evidence admitted that the trailer had 
previously been damaged, prior to Mr. Nelson's observations of Mr. Huff, including 
damage to the locking mechanisms of the trailer. Mr. Nelson testified that he observed 
damage to the locking mechanisms by two unknown persons before he allegedly saw 
Mr. Huff pick up the piece of wood and presumably hit the back of the trailer with it. 
(Tr., 83, Ls.10-13, p.86, Ls.19-23.) In his closing argument, the prosecutor implied that 
it was Mr. Huff who initially caused the damage to the locking mechanism: 
So what the Defense is trying to suggest, that coincidentally some 
unknown people caused the majority of this damage and then Mr. Huff 
showed up soon thereafter and, unbeknownst to him, these other two 
people had tried to break in and that he just thought, "I'm going to commit 
some vandalism right now and commit this vandalism, and then I was 
caught." What a coincidence. We have these two unknown burglars in the 
area at the same time Mr. Huff was trying to just vandalize the lock of the 
trailer. That is not reasonable to believe that. So rely on your common 
sense in making this decision. That's what it means to - that's what 
reasonable doubt's all about is that common sense. 
(Tr., p.175, Ls.3-16.) 
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Some members of the jury could have found that the act of hitting the locking 
mechanism was committed by Mr. Huff and constituted the attempt, while other 
members of the jury may have felt that Mr. Huff's act of picking up the piece of wood 
was an attempt. Ultimately, Mr. Huff could have been convicted of attempted burglary 
either by the actions of the two unknown individuals in the alley who damaged the 
latching mechanisms on the trailer, or by the act of picking up the board and/or by 
hitting the trailer with the board or perhaps even by hiding in the bushes that night. 
This is not the unanimous jury verdict contemplated by the Idaho Constitution,3 
I.C. §§ 19-2316 and 19-2317 and Idaho Criminal Rule 31. See Montoya, 140 Idaho at 
167 (requiring a finding of the "defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on a 
single agreed upon incident. ... "); Gain, 140 Idaho at 173 (requiring the jury to 
unanimously agree "on the specific incident constituting the offense in each count.") 
Miller, 135 Idaho at 268 (holding that defendant was entitled to an instruction requiring 
that the jury find him guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of a single agreed upon 
incident). Because separate and distinct incidents of criminal conduct in this case could 
provide a basis for the jurors' finding of guilt on the criminal charges of attempted 
burglary, the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury that it must unanimously 
agree on the specific incident constituting the offense. 
3 In Idaho, in all criminal cases, the jury's verdict must be a unanimous verdict. See 
I.C. §§ 19-2316, 19-2317, Idaho Criminal Rule 31. Furthermore, the Idaho Constitution 
provides that in a felony criminal trial a jury's verdict must be unanimous. See IDAHO 
CONST. art. I, §7. Although section seven does not specifically state that felony trials 
require a unanimous verdict, that conclusion is inescapable from the provision's 
language. "The right of a trial by jury shall remain inviolate; but in civil actions, three-
fourths of the jury may render a verdict, and the legislature may provide that in all cases 
of misdemeanors five-sixths of the jury may render a verdict." Id. By failing to provide 
for less than a unanimous verdict in felony cases, but providing for such in other types 
of cases, the Idaho constitution guarantees the right to a unanimous jury verdict in all 
felony criminal cases. 
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Thus it is impossible to tell whether the jury reached a unanimous verdict on any 
of the separate and distinct acts that could potentially constitute an attempt to 
burglarize. Because it is impossible to tell whether the jury correctly reached its verdict 
unanimously, or incorrectly reached its verdict based upon divergent theories, this Court 
must vacate the conviction and remand the case for a new trial. See State v. Luke, 134 
Idaho 294, 301 (2000). 
C. The District Court's Failure To Give A Necessary Jury Instruction Is Fundamental 
Error 
Mr. Huff acknowledges that no objection was made to the omitted jury instruction 
on unanimity. Therefore, the claim raised is one of fundamental error. The Idaho 
Supreme Court has set forth the standard of appellate review of unobjected-to error. 
See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010). Under the three-part test for fundamental 
error as set forth in Perry, a defendant must demonstrate that: 1) one or more of his 
unwaived constitutional rights were violated; 2) there was a clear and obvious error 
without the need for additional information not contained in the appellate record; and 3) 
the error affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning that there is a reasonable 
probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial proceedings. Id. at 226. 
Mr. Huff meets all the prongs of this test. 
First, the alleged error is a violation of Mr. Huff's right to a unanimous jury verdict 
and right to be free from double jeopardy. The right to a unanimous jury verdict in a 
felony criminal trial is so fundamental to the citizens of Idaho that it has been expressed 
in both the constitution and in statutes. See IDAHO CONST. art. I, §7, I.C. §§ 19-2316, 
19-2317 and Idaho Criminal Rule 31. 
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The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, "in all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury .... " Similarly, Article I, section 7 of the Idaho Constitution provides, 'The 
right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate .... " Idaho Const. art. I, § 7. This section 
"guarantee[s] the right to a trial by jury, which means a jury which has not been mislead 
by erroneous instructions to a defendant's prejudice .... " State v. Taylor, 59 Idaho 724, 
, 87 P.2d 454, 460 (1939). See also Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748 
(1948) (Unanimity in jury verdicts is required where the Sixth and Seventh Amendments 
apply, "In criminal cases this requirement of unanimity extends to all issues-character 
or degree of the crime, guilt and punishment-which are left to the jury."). 
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment is the constitutional 
guarantee protecting a defendant against multiple punishments for the same offense, 
and is the right implicated when a unanimity instruction is at issue. U.S. CONST. 
amend. V. In State v. Major, the Idaho Supreme Court held that charging a defendant 
with one crime when more were in fact committed exposes the defendant to double 
jeopardy: 
Whether a course of conduct constitutes one offense or several can be a 
troublesome question. The distinction is important: to charge a defendant 
with two offenses when only one was committed violates the defendant's 
right against double jeopardy, U.S. Const.amend. V, Idaho Const. art. 1, § 
13; conversely, to charge a defendant with one offense when more than 
one was committed can prejudice the defendant "in the shaping of 
evidentiary rulings, in producing a conviction on less than a unanimous 
verdict as to each separate offense, in sentencing, in limiting review on 
appeal, and in exposing the defendant to double jeopardy." Criminal 
Procedure, § 19.2(e), p. 457. 
State v. Major, 111 Idaho 410, 414 (1986) (holding that a new trial was necessary as it 
was impossible to determine whether the jury convicted the defendant solely on the 
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basis of the alleged possession on the reservation, or for both alleged possessions 
occurring both on and off the reservation where there was no unanimity instruction). 
Here, the jurors could reasonably have concluded that they were directed to find 
Mr. Huff guilty of attempted burglary if they found that he performed any of a variety of 
acts which could each constitute the crime of attempt. The jurors were not instructed as 
to what theory of liability the State was proceeding on-that is, what act or acts the 
State alleged constituted attempted burglary, nor was the jury instructed that they must 
unanimously agree on what act constituted an attempted burglary. Such an 
interpretation misled the jury and deprived Mr. Huff of his right to a unanimous verdict 
and implicated his right to be free from double jeopardy; thus, the jury instructions in this 
case were unconstitutional. The error implicates Mr. Huff's unwaived constitutional 
rights. 
Second, the error is clear and obvious from the record. The law is clear that a 
defendant as a right to a unanimous verdict. The Double Jeopardy Clause clearly 
prohibits multiple punishments for the same offense, providing that no person shall "be 
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." The jury 
instructions are in the record, so there is no need for additional information outside the 
record. Further, there is no evidence that the failure to object to the instruction was a 
strategic decision, as Mr. Huff gained absolutely no strategic advantage by giving the 
jury an opportunity to convict him of "an act" which could include any of the following: 
the damage to the locking mechanism of the trailer by unknown persons in the alley 
earlier that day, loitering near the trailer, holding a piece of wood with a nail in it, hitting 
the trailer with the piece of wood, or hiding in some bushes. Further, trial counsel 
strenuously argued in his closing remarks to the jury that none of the acts Mr. Huff was 
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alleged to have committed constituted attempted burglary. (Tr., p.168, L.6 - p.172, 
L.24.) 
Third, there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the 
proceedings. While the jury heard evidence that Mr. Nelson saw Mr. Huff's feet and 
heard noises in the direction of the trailer (Trial Tr., p.145, Ls.20-23), the jury also heard 
evidence that the damage to the locking mechanisms of the trailer was present prior to 
Mr. Nelson confronting Mr. Huff at the trailer, and had possibly been done earlier that 
day, by two unknown persons. (Tr., p.111, Ls.3-9.) Even the prosecutor alternated 
between differing theories as to what act constituted attempted burglary, and ultimately 
failed to clarify which act the jury should find was an attempt. Thus, due to the lack of a 
unanimity jury instruction, the jury was misled as it was left with the impression that it 
could convict Mr. Huff if it found that he committed any of a various litany of acts. There 
was no instruction that the jurors agree as to what act or acts constituted the attempt. 
Because the failure of the district court to give the jury this instruction violated 
Mr. Huff's right to a unanimous verdict and right to be free from double jeopardy, and 
because he meets all three prongs of Idaho's fundamental error test, Mr. Huff's 
conviction must be vacated. 
11. 
The State Failed To Present Substantial, Competent Evidence To Support 
Mr. Huff's Conviction For Attempted Burglary 
The State failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove Mr. Huff guilty of 
attempted burglary because it failed to prove that he attempted to enter the trailer with 
the intent to commit theft. An appellate court's review of the sufficiency of the evidence 
to support a conviction is limited in scope. State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104 
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(Ct. App. 2001). The reviewing court will not set aside the judgment of conviction 
following a jury verdict, if "there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of 
fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential 
elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Crawford, 130 Idaho 592, 
594 (Ct. App. 1997). 
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court will conduct an 
independent review of the evidence in the record to determine whether a reasonable 
mind could conclude that each material element of the offense was proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. State v. Willard, 129 Idaho 827, 828 (Ct. App. 1997); Knutson, 121 
Idaho at 104. The Court will not substitute its views for that of the jury when 
determining "the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, and 
the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence." Crawford, 130 Idaho at 595. 
Furthermore, the Court will consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution. Id. In State v. Mitchell, 130 Idaho 134 (Ct. App. 1997), it was noted that, 
"[e]vidence is regarded as substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and 
rely upon it in determining whether a disputed point of fact has been proved." Id. at 135. 
The attempt statute, Idaho Code § 18-306, provides that "[e]very person who 
attempts to commit any crime, but fails, or is prevented or intercepted in the perpetration 
thereof" is subject to punishment for an attempted commission of that crime. 
Idaho courts have held that an attempt consists of two elements: (1) an intent to 
do an act or bring about certain consequences which would in law amount to a crime, 
and (2) an act in furtherance of that intent which goes beyond mere preparation. See 
State v Otto, 102 Idaho 250, 251 (1981); State v. Fabeny, 132 Idaho 917, 923 (Ct. App. 
1999). The preparatory phase of a crime consists of "devising or arranging the means 
17 
or measures necessary for the commission of the offense." Otto, 102 Idaho at 251 
(quoting Perkins, Criminal Law 557 (2d ed.1969)). "To go beyond mere preparation, the 
actions of the defendant must reach far enough toward the accomplishment of the 
desired result to amount to the commencement of the consummation of the crime." 
State v. Glass, 139 Idaho 815, 818 (Ct. App. 2003) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). 
"The intent of the accused is a question of fact for the jury to determine. Direct 
evidence as to intent is not required. A jury may infer intent from the commission of 
acts and the surrounding circumstances." State v. Marsh, 141 Idaho 862, 867 (Ct. App. 
2004) (citations omitted); State v. Nastoff, 124 Idaho 667, 671 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding 
that there was no substantial evidence in the record upon which the jury could have 
found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally started the fire). 
Here, the State failed to prove that Mr. Huff had the requisite intent to take 
something from the trailer. It is the responsibility of the parties to ensure that their 
respective positions and arguments are in the record for appellate review. See State v. 
Allen, 143 Idaho 267 (Ct. App. 2006) ("An appellate court can know only what is 
revealed on the record and it is therefore incumbent upon the respective attorneys to 
clearly and unambiguously state the entire plea agreement on the record.") 
Mr. Huff asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for 
attempted burglary, because there was no substantial evidence that would have proven 
the essential element of intent beyond a reasonable doubt. There was no evidence or 
testimony at trial that Mr. Huff was trying to enter the trailer, and further, there was no 
evidence that Mr. Huff intended to commit the crime of theft. There was simply no 
evidence or testimony at all that Mr. Huff intended to commit theft Although intent can 
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be inferred, there was no evidence that Mr. Huff was trying to enter the trailer at all. 
Mr. Nelson testified that he had observed what he thought was Mr. Huff twice hitting the 
trailer with a piece of wood. No juror could then have found beyond a reasonable doubt 
that there existed substantial evidence that Mr. Huff was trying to enter the trailer to take 
whatever was inside the trailer. 
Even if the jury disbelieved Mr. Huff's explanation to Mr. Nelson that he was 
trying to break the nails off of the piece of wood by striking it against the trailer 
(Tr., p.97, Ls.1-6), there was still no evidence or testimony as to what he was trying to 
do. He was an intoxicated man striking a trailer with a piece of wood. It was not 
reasonable to infer that he was trying to break into the trailer to steal something. 
Ultimately there was absolutely no evidence that Mr. Huff was attempting to enter 
the trailer, and there was no evidence that he was trying to enter the trailer for the 
purpose of taking what was inside the trailer. At most, Mr. Huff was intending to commit 
malicious injury to property, although there was no testimony or evidence that his 
actions actually inflicted harm on the trailer. Instead, there was an appalling lack of 
evidence that Mr. Huff was actually trying to get into the trailer. Further, there was no 
basis for the jury to infer that he intended to take anything from the trailer, once he 
gained access. There were no such facts or evidence submitted at trial. No statement 
by Mr. Huff as to his intent was ever admitted, no evidence, circumstantial or direct, was 
ever introduced that his intent in striking the trailer with a piece of wood was anything 
other than what he told Mr. Nelson-that the was trying to get the nails out of the wood. 
Thus Mr. Huff's conviction for attempted burglary cannot be upheld. 
The record contains no evidence that Mr. Huff was trying to inflict damage to the 
locking mechanism of the trailer, there was no evidence that Mr. Huff was trying to gain 
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access to the trailer, and therefore the jury could not reasonably infer that he was trying 
to enter the trailer to commit the crime of theft. Thus, insufficient evidence exists to 
support his conviction for attempted burglary. 
111. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed An Aggregate Sentence Of 
Three Years, With One Year Fixed, Upon Mr. Huff Following His Conviction For 
Attempted Burglary 
Mr. Huff asserts that, given any view of the facts, his aggregate sentence of 
three years, with one year fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the 
sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will 
conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the 
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See 
State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Huff does not allege that his 
sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of 
discretion, Mr. Huff must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was 
excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or objectives of 
criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and 
the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution 
for wrongdoing. Id. 
In light of Mr. Huff's rehabilitative potential, the district court abused its discretion 
in retaining jurisdiction over Mr. Huff instead of placing him on probation. The district 
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court failed to consider the fact that Mr. Huff was aware of his alcohol problem, was 
interested in seeking treatment for his addiction, and that, with programming, Mr. Huff 
could likely be successful in the community. (Presentence Investigation Report 
(hereinafter, PSI), pp.17-18.) 
Mr. Huff has not had an easy life. He began drinking alcohol and using 
marijuana at age twelve, and his childhood included exposure to physical abuse, 
instability, and a great deal of family alcohol abuse. (PSI, p.11, 16, 18.) Mr. Huff 
reported that his mother and his grandparents drank a lot and he and his siblings would 
steal their alcohol and drink it.4 (PSI, p.11.) 
Mr. Huff has a good work history. He was regularly employed as a cook prior to 
his incarceration. (PSI, p.14.) Idaho recognizes that good employment history should 
be considered a mitigating factor. See State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982); see a/so 
State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982). 
Another consideration that should have received the attention of the district court 
is the fact that Mr. Huff has strong support from his family members. See State v. 
Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594-595 (1982) (reducing sentence of defendant who had the 
support of his family and employer in his rehabilitation efforts). Mr. Huff has a long-time 
girlfriend, Linda Hurt, who he has been with for over five years. (PSI, p.12.) They "take 
care of each other." (PSI, p.12.) 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that military service is considered a 
mitigating factor at sentencing. In Nice, the Court found the defendant's honorable 
discharge from the military to be a factor in mitigation of sentence. State v. Nice, 103 
4 Mr. Huff's grandparents helped raise him and his siblings as his father left the family 
when he was approximately three months old. (PSI, p.11.) 
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Idaho 89, 90 (1982). Mr. Huff is a veteran of the U.S. Army, where he served for two 
years and was honorably discharged. (PSI, p.13.) 
Mr. Huff has serious medical problems. Mr. Huff's medical problems are so 
serious, that he was taken to the emergency room during his trial. (Tr., p.53, Ls.4-7.) 
Mr. Huff suffers from ulcers and tumors in his colon, and takes four medications several 
times daily, including hydrocodone for pain. (PSI, p.15.) Mr. Huff also suffers from a 
traumatic brain injury and foot pain after his right foot was crushed in an accident. (PSI, 
p.15.) 
Mr. Huff has been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and multiple traumatic brain 
injuries. (PSI, p.15.) The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that Idaho Code § 19-
2523 requires the trial court to consider a defendant's mental illness as a sentencing 
factor. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999). While Mr. Huff was previously 
taking medications to manage his mental health conditions, he ceased taking the 
medications in 2011. (PSI, p.15.) Mr. Huff still suffers from mood swings and does 
believe that he is in need of a mental health evaluation. (PSI, p.15.) Even the 
presentence investigator concluded that Mr. Huff would benefit from mental health 
evaluation. (PSI, p.19.) The presentence investigator noted that Mr. Huff was also 
diagnosed with depression during his substance abuse evaluation. (PSI, p.19.) 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that substance abuse should be considered 
as a mitigating factor by the district court when that court imposes sentence. State v. 
Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982). In Nice, the Idaho Supreme Court reduced a sentence 
based on Nice's lack of prior record and the fact that "the trial court did not give proper 
consideration of the defendant's alcoholic problem, the part it played in causing the 
defendant to commit the crime and the suggested alternatives for treating the problem." 
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Id. at 91. Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that ingestion of drugs and 
alcohol resulting in impaired capacity to appreciate criminality of conduct, could be a 
mitigating circumstance. State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414 (1981). Mr. Huff began 
drinking alcohol around the age of 12 years old and drinks all day, every day. (PSI, 
p.16.) Mr. Huff becomes intoxicated almost every time he drinks. (PSI, p.16.) 
However, Mr. Huff realizes that he is in need of a drug and alcohol treatment program. 
(PSI, p.17.) He is aware that his drug and alcohol use has caused him problems with 
the law, his family, his employment and his health. (PSI, p.17.) Mr. Huff wants to turn 
his life around. (PSI, p.17.) Mr. Huff is a severe alcoholic who is physically dependent 
on alcohol, thus he will require stabilization of his co-occurring severe bio-medical 
conditions and severe withdrawal problems.5 (PSI, p.17.) Mr. Huff is hopeful for the 
future-his goals are to stop drinking, get healthier, and get his life back. (PSI, p.18.) 
Further, Mr. Huff expressed remorse for his acts. Mr. Huff, in his PSI 
Questionnaire, wrote that he felt "stupid" for the attempted burglary incident. (PSI, 
p.18.) He also wanted the court to know that he realized that he had a drinking problem 
and that he wanted to receive help for his drinking problem as well as his health 
problems. (PSI, p.18.) Idaho recognizes that some leniency is required when a 
defendant expresses remorse for his conduct and accepts responsibility for his acts. 
State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982); State v. Alberls, 121 Idaho 204, 209 
(Ct. App. 1991 ). For example, in Alberls, the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that some 
leniency is required when the defendant has expressed "remorse for his conduct, his 
recognition of his problem, his willingness to accept treatment and other positive 
5 Mr. Huff is so physically dependent on alcohol that his treating physician prescribed 
him a beer. (PSI, pp.17, 42.) 
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attributes of his character." Alberts, 121 Idaho at 209. In Shideler, Idaho Supreme 
Court ruled that the prospect of Shideler's recovery from his poor mental and physical 
health, which included mood swings, violent outbursts, and drug abuse, coupled with his 
remorse for his actions, was so compelling that it outweighed the gravity of the crimes of 
armed robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, and possession of a firearm during the 
commission of a crime. Shideler, 103 Idaho at 594-95. Therefore, the court reduced 
Shideler's sentence from an indeterminate term not to exceed twenty years to an 
indeterminate term not to exceed twelve years. Id. at 593. 
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Huff asserts that the district court 
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him. He asserts that 
had the district court properly considered his family support, work history, and remorse, 
it would have placed him on probation. Alternatively, the district court should have 
imposed a less severe sentence. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Huff respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction for attempted 
burglary and remand that case for a new trial. Alternatively, he requests that this Court 
reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate or remand his case to the district court for 
a new sentencing hearing. 
DATED this 20th day of September, 2013. 
ublic Defender 
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